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Abstract 
Department of Defense (DoD) spending on services has been trending 
upwards for over a decade and, as of 2011, accounts for 56% of total contract 
spending.  The increased reliance on services contractors has prompted the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) to look more closely at the acquisition and 
contract management process.  The term program management describes the 
approach and methodology needed for the management of complicated projects.  
We used the program management approach to address the following questions:  
(1) How do different stakeholders define successful services contracts within the 
Navy? (2) How do different stakeholders measure services contracts within the 
Navy? and (3) How should Navy services contracts be defined and measured?  We 
conducted a survey of 168 key stakeholders.  We discovered that when defining and 
measuring the success of a service contract all stakeholders tend to utilize outcome-
related factors over process-oriented factors.  We believe this is because outcomes 
tend to drive perceptions of success more than processes and are more easily 
quantifiable.  Metrics used to measure success are typically related to cost, 
schedule, and performance.  Based on these findings, we provide recommendations 
on establishing better internal control measures, putting in place an operational audit 
process, and creating a standardized reporting process. 
Keywords: Services Contracts, Services Acquisition, Stakeholder Theory, 
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Department of Defense (DoD) spending on services has been trending 
upwards for over a decade and, as of 2011, accounted for 56% of total contract 
spending, compared to 48% in 2000 (Berteau, Ben-Ari, Sanders, Morrow, & Ellman, 
2012).  Figure 1 shows DoD spending trends across six broad services categories 
by compounded annual growth rate (CAGR).  The categories used are information 
and communications technology (ICT); professional, administrative, and 
management services (PAMS); research and development (R&D); equipment-
related services (ERS); facility-related services and construction services (FRS&C); 
and medical services (Berteau et al., 2012).  The Center for Strategic and 
International Studies modified the standard DoD portfolio grouping by adjusting 
services codes to more appropriately align with their respective categories (Berteau 
et al., 2012).  In fiscal year (FY) 2011, more than half of the DoD’s $375 billion in 
contract obligations was for services (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 
2012a).  The DoD has steadily increased its reliance on services contractors to 
augment its critical capability shortfalls across the six services categories shown in 
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Figure 1. Defense Contract Spending by Services Area 2000–2011  
(Berteau et al., 2012) 
As DoD spending on services has increased over the last 10 years, numerous 
published Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Department of Defense 
Inspector General (DoDIG) reports have cited deficiencies in multiple areas of the 
contracting process.  Between 2001 and 2009, the GAO issued 16 reports citing 
deficiencies in the acquisition of services.  Between FY2003 and FY2008, the 
DoDIG issued 142 reports citing weaknesses in the acquisition and contract 
administration process (DoDIG, 2009).  Contract management has been on the GAO 
high-risk list since 1992, revealing the difficulties in meeting services procurement, 
cost, schedule, and performance objectives (Apte, Apte, & Rendon, 2010).  Deficient 
process areas found by both the GAO and DoDIG included market reasearch, 
contract type, requirements management, project management, contractor 
oversight, and personnel training (Apte et al., 2010).  These cited problems are 
compounded by an acquisition workforce that has remained the same size since 
2001, while spending services have doubled over the same period (GAO, 2009b).  
The DoD’s contract management process capabilities have also been found to be 
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contract closeout phases, specifically, have even lower process capability than the 
other phases. 
The DoD needs to focus on improving services contract mangement by first 
identifying how disparate stakeholders define and measure the success of services 
acquisitions.  Research is necessary to gain an increased understanding of differing 
stakeholders’ goals and objectives, which could be used to develop a standardized 
definition of services acquisition success and to align stakeholders towards a 
common goal.  In order to maximize the use of scarce acquisition resources and 
improve outcomes, research is necessary to identify and provide recommendations 
on the factors of successful services contracts. 
B. Purpose 
The primary purpose of this study was to conduct further analysis of services 
contracting management practices within the Navy.  The objective of this research 
was to build upon the understanding developed in prior research projects to 
generate metrics for defining and measuring successful services contracts.  These 
developed metrics will later help identify factors that influence successful services 
contract outcomes.  We designed a survey based on the exploratory findings of 
Frank Miller, James Newton, and Salvatore D’Amato (2012) in Defining and 
Measuring Success of Service Contracts.  We distributed our survey to the primary 
stakeholders for services acquisitions to determine how different stakeholders define 
and measure success.  The findings of this project will support the continued 
research of Dr. Rene G. Rendon, PhD, and Dr. Uday M. Apte, PhD, on the DoD’s 
management of services contracts.  
C. Research Questions 
In our efforts to build upon prior research, we attempted to answer the same 
questions that Miller, Newton, and D’Amato presented in their 2012 project.  The 
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 How do different stakeholders define successful services contracts 
within the Navy? 
 How do different stakeholders measure services contracts within the 
Navy?  
 How should Navy services contracts be defined and measured?  
D. Benefits and Limitations of This Project 
This research builds on the exploratory findings from the 2012 Miller, Newton, 
and D’Amato project. The results of this project can be used to strengthen 
contracting professionals’ understanding of successful services acquisitions from 
disparate stakeholder perspectives.  Improved understanding of this subject will 
enable the development of metrics to measure the success of services contracts.  In 
this study, we attempt to identify the cogent elements that drive increased 
performance and decreased cost for taxpayers. 
This research was limited by the sample size of stakeholders surveyed 
relative to the population of stakeholders involved in services acquisitions.  Due to 
limited availability of stakeholder subjects, obtaining a larger sample size was not 
feasible for this project. 
E. Research Methodology 
We addressed the research questions with an anonymous online survey sent 
to stakeholders employed by the Department of the Navy.  The survey contained 
seven demographic questions, three open-ended questions, seven multiple-choice 
questions, and four ranking questions.  This survey was adapted from the original 
survey developed by Miller, Newton, and D’Amato (2012).  We used the findings 
from their research to refine questions and limit potential ambiguity in data collection. 
F. Organization of Report 
This report is organized into five chapters.  Chapter I includes background 
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the project, and the research methodology.  In Chapter II, we review literature on the 
services contracting process, Agency and Stakeholder Theories, the various 
stakeholders involved, and critical success factors.  We examine various GAO and 
DoDIG reports and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (USD[AT&L]) guidance concerning current weaknesses in the services 
contracting process.  In Chapter III, we explain how we collected and analyzed our 
data and, specifically, how we created our survey instrument and our analytical 
process.  We also provide a brief description of the commands that participated in 
the survey.  In Chapter IV, we provide our survey findings and discuss our research 
results.  In Chapter V, we provide a summary of and conclusions related to our 
research, and we also offer recommendations for improving services acquisitions in 
the Navy.  We also provide areas for further study in DoD services acquisitions. 
G. Summary 
In Chapter I, we provided background information on services acquisitions, 
the purpose of the research, research questions, benefits and limitations of the 
research, and the methodology and organization of the report.  Spending on 
services contracts has doubled over the last 10 years, despite an acquisition 
workforce that has not expanded to meet this increased workload.  Indeed, the DoD 
has significant challenges to address in contract management to remove the GAO’s 
high-risk billing.  The primary focus of this report is the research questions 
presented.  In Chapter II, we review literature on deficiencies in services contracting, 
a program management approach to services acquisitions, the services contracting 
process, Agency and Stakeholder Theories, stakeholders involved in the process, 
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II. Literature Review 
A. Introduction 
In Chapter I, we established the foundation of this research.  In this chapter, 
we provide a literature review of services contracting.  This review covers the 
following topics: deficiencies in services contracting, the need for a program 
management approach to the services contracting process, the current services 
contracting process, Stakeholder Theory and the various stakeholders on the 
acquisition team, critical success factors, and the application of Agency Theory to 
the services contracting process. We also show how both Agency Theory and 
Stakeholder Theory can be tied to contracting for services and describe why there is 
a need for a program management approach to the process.  In the next section, we 
examine specific discrepancies that are noted in GAO, USD(AT&L), and DoDIG 
reports. 
B. Deficiencies in Services Contracts  
DoD services contract obligations have risen from $92 billion in 2001 to over 
$200 billion in 2008 (GAO, 2009a).  In FY2006, more funds were obligated for 
services contracts than for supplies and equipment combined (GAO, 2007a).  This 
massive spending growth in services is not attributable solely to the sizable logistical 
support efforts required in Iraq and Afghanistan.  In 2008, these operations 
accounted for $25 billion of the $200 billion spent on services, but the remaining 
growth is due to other factors (GAO, 2009a).  These factors include contractors 
filling roles previously held by government employees through outsourcing and the 
DoD using services contracts for historically non-services acquisitions (GAO, 
2007a).  It is important to note that during the recent years of defense spending 
drawdown (2008–2011), spending on services has decreased at a lower percentage 
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The significant growth in services spending discussed previously is 
accompanied by a contracting workforce that has remained relatively the same size 
since 2001 (GAO, 2009b).  Prior to 2001, the acquisition workforce was slashed by 
nearly 50% from 1989 to 1999 (GAO, 2012c).  A sufficiently trained and competent 
acquisition workforce is necessary for effective contract management and is needed 
to achieve successful defense acquisition outcomes (Apte et al., 2010).  The GAO 
(2009b) reports that acquisition workforce capability shortfalls make it difficult to 
ensure that value is achieved and expose the Department of Defense to 
unnecessary risk.  Figure 2 shows the shrinking acquisition workforce as 
procurement appropriations soared since 1998. 
 
Figure 2. DoD Procurement Appropriations and Acquisition Workforce 
(Gansler, 2011) 
In this section, we look further into the deficient contracting areas noted by 
the DoDIG and GAO.  Government reports indicate insufficient or undocumented 
market research during the acquisition planning process for services (DoDIG, 2009; 
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(FAR, 2012), and its purpose is to reveal the market’s capability of meeting the 
government’s specific acquisition requirement and to assist in determining the 
appropriate acquisition strategy to fulfill it (FAR, 2012).  Market research is also 
necessary to enhance competition and to ensure government socioeconomic 
objectives are achieved.  A primary government socioeconomic objective is to 
promote opportunities for small business concerns to compete for government 
acquisitions.  The government uses small business set-asides to award certain 
acquisitions exclusively to small business concerns and more specific categories 
such as services-disabled veteran-owned small  businesses (FAR, 2012).  Market 
research will determine if an acquisition is suitable for set-aside by determining if 
responsible small business concerns can satisfy the government’s requirement.  
The GAO and DoDIG have found inappropriate contract types used on 
services contracts, which leads the government to shoulder increased cost risk 
(DoDIG, 2009; GAO, 2009a).  Specifically, the GAO found the overuse of high-risk 
time-and-materials contracts due to their ease of use, speed, and flexibility (GAO, 
2009a).  The use of time-and-materials contracts should be limited because they 
provide no incentive to the contractor for cost control and efficiency (GAO, 2009a).  
There is not a blanket good or bad type of contract, only the inappropriate use of a 
specific contract type in a procurement.  The appropriate contract type is necessary 
to properly distribute contract risk between the government and contractor, and to 
provide the contractor with the most incentive for efficient performance. 
The use of a proven program management approach is considered a best 
practice for managing services contracts (Apte et al., 2010).  A program 
management approach utilizes methods such as formal project managers, project 
teams, integrated processes, and a project life cycle to manage contracts.  Despite 
these  proven best practices, government reports have shown that the DoD does not 
have an adequate management structure to oversee services acquisitions at both 
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Government reports have repeatedly identified contractor oversight and 
contract administration as serious problems in services contract management 
(DoDIG, 2009; GAO, 2007b, 2007c, 2009a).  Proper oversight and administration 
ensure that contractors are providing timely and quality services in accordance with 
the terms of the contract and mitigate contractor performance risk throughout the 
period of performance. 
Both the GAO and DoDIG have identified poorly defined services 
requirements as a deficient area of services contracts (DoDIG, 2009; GAO, 2009a).  
A clearly defined description of what the contractor is required to provide the 
government is necessary to effectively hold contractors accountable, meet customer 
needs, and ensure that the best value is achieved. 
The noted deficiencies discussed in this section provide insight into why 
contract management has been on the GAO high-risk list for 20 years.  
Improvements in multiple contract management areas are required to effectively 
reduce the government’s exposure to the risk of overpaying for services. 
With DoD financial resources declining since 2009, the DoD must achieve 
optimal value for defense acquisitions.  In his 2010 Better Buying Power Guidance 
Memorandum (OUSD[AT&L]), the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics; USD[AT&L]) acknowledged that DoD practices for 
services procurement are far less mature than for weapons systems, and he 
provided guidance to improve services acquisition efficiency.  The USD(AT&L) 
directed each branch to appoint a flag-level senior manager for services, adopt a 
standard taxonomy for types of services, and address the root causes of poor 
tradecraft in services (OUSD[AT&L], 2010).  The component senior manager for 
services will be responsible for governing the planning, execution, strategic sourcing, 
and management of services contracts (OUSD[AT&L], 2010). This USD(AT&L) 
initiative takes steps to address weaknesses cited by the GAO in strategic 
management of services acquisitions.  A standard taxonomy of reporting categories 
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the ability to measure productivity and success across the DoD.  The USD(AT&L) 
cited the following examples of poor tradecraft that must be improved: mission 
creep, one-bid competitive procurements, misuse of time-and-materials and award 
fee contracts, and the need to incentivize productivity for large services contracts 
(OUSD[AT&L], 2010). The Secretary’s strategic guidance is an important step in 
addressing the problems found by the GAO and DoDIG, and it provides a path for 
delivering better value to the taxpayers. 
The deficiencies described previously are significant and by no means 
comprehensive.  There are numerous other examples of insufficient oversight, lack 
of knowledge by acquisition personnel, and improper contract administration.  Some 
of the deficiencies listed could be corrected if a program management approach was 
widely implemented by the DoD into the services contracting process.  In the next 
section, we give a brief overview of program management concepts and how they 
could be applied to services acquisitions. 
C. Program Management Approach to Services Acquisitions 
The lack of a mature program management infrastructure and a life-cycle 
approach to services acquisition project management exposes the DoD to the risk of 
not meeting cost, schedule, and performance objectives (Apte & Rendon, 2007). 
The DoDIG and GAO identified critical deficiencies when examining the DoD’s 
existing management structure for acquiring services.  In this section, we review 
basic program management concepts and the implications of research conducted by 
Apte and Rendon (2007), which examined the application of a program management 
approach and project management concepts to services acquisition. 
1. Overview of the Program Management Approach and Project 
Management Concepts 
Apte and Rendon (2007) use the term program management to describe the 
approach and methodology needed for the management of complicated projects. A 
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of cost, schedule, and performance objectives, and represents the coordinated 
centralized management of multiple projects to achieve the program’s strategic 
objectives and benefits (Apte & Rendon, 2007; Project Management Institute [PMI], 
2008). A systematic program management approach includes the following basic 
project management concepts: project life cycle, integrated processes, project team 
structure, a project manager, and a suitable organizational structure (Apte & 
Rendon, 2007).  These project management concepts are examined in further detail 
in the following paragraphs. 
The first project management concept we examine is the project life cycle.  
The Project Management Institute (PMI) Project Management Body of Knowledge 
(PMBOK; 2008) defines project life cycle as a collection of generally sequential 
phases whose name and number are determined by the control needs of the 
organization(s) involved in the project.  By dividing the project into phases, 
management is more effectively able to control activities within each phase and the 
overall progress of the project (Apte & Rendon, 2007).  The Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook (DAU, 2012) breaks the project life cycle into the following phases: 
material solution analysis, technology development, engineering and manufacturing 
development, production and deployment, and operations and support. 
Integrated processes are an essential element of a systematic program 
management approach and are vital to project success.  The PMI PMBOK (2008) 
identifies five project management process groups required for any project. These 
groups are initiating, planning, executing, monitoring and controlling, and closing 
processes (PMI, 2008). Each process group includes functional phases, such as 
cost and schedule management, that are part of a respective process group (PMI, 
2008). A structured program management approach integrates these processes to 
ensure coordination and unity of the total program effort. 
The project team structure, with cross-functional expertise across various 
disciplines, is necessary to effectively integrate project management efforts to 
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integrated subject-matter experts must coordinate and determine which, and to what 
degree, respective integrated processes are appropriate for the effort (PMI, 2008). 
For an effective program management approach, a project manager must be 
designated by the organization to synchronize the project activities of the various 
functional team members towards the overall project objectives.  Complex projects 
require the project manager to oversee activities and determine applicable resource 
applications to these activities (PMI, 2008). 
The appropriate organizational structure is a vital element of a disciplined 
program management approach.  Organizational structures influence how projects 
are conducted and range from functional to project specific, with various matrix types 
in between (PMI, 2008).  Selection of a suitable organizational structure that 
supports the integrated processes, project teams, and project manager will 
substantially contribute to project success (Apte & Rendon, 2007).  In the next 
section, we look at how program management concepts are currently applied to 
weapons systems acquisitions. 
2. Application of Program Management Concepts to Weapons 
Systems Acquisitions  
Program management concepts are well established for defense weapons 
systems acquisitions and are essential practices for complex high-technology 
weapons systems projects (Apte & Rendon, 2007).  The defense acquisition life 
cycle is a disciplined management process that takes acquisition programs through 
a series of phases, milestones, decision points, and reports.  Control gates assist 
with keeping projects within the three major constraints of cost, schedule, and 
performance (Rendon & Snider, 2008). DoD Instruction 5000.2 (OUSD[AT&L], 2008) 
establishes the Defense Acquisition Management System as the project life cycle for 
Major Defense Acquisition Programs and was updated in 2008 to specifically include 
services.  (See Figure 3 for an illustration of the milestones and phases of the DoD 
Acquisition Management Framework.)  The program manager is the designated 
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performance; and reports to the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA; OUSD[AT&L], 
2003).  Integrated processes and integrated product teams (IPTs), which are 
established by DoD 5000 regulations, enable program managers to maintain 
continual and effective communication throughout project execution (Apte & 
Rendon, 2007).  The DoD relies substantially on tailored organizational structures to 
enhance integration of project processes and project teams for weapons systems 
acquisition programs (Apte & Rendon, 2007).  The DoD typically uses matrix and 
projectized (project specific) organizational structures for weapons systems 
acquisitions.  The type of tailored organizational structure used for a specific project 
depends on factors such as the number of functional areas involved in the project, 
the degree of integration required within the functional areas and between the 
organization and customer, and the organization’s experience level for the work that 
the project requires (Apte & Rendon, 2007).  Integrated project teams are cross-
functional teams with subject-matter experts from multiple functional areas, including 
engineering, contracting, financial management, logistics, and legal (Apte & Rendon, 
2007).  These teams are led and managed by the designated project manager who 
ensures coordination and integration to accomplish the project’s objective (Apte & 
Rendon, 2007).  In the next section, we examine how these proven program 
management concepts for weapons systems can be applied to services acquisitions. 
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3. Application of Program Management Concepts to Services 
Acquisitions 
Apte and Rendon (2007) assessed current services acquisition practices at 
various activity levels of the Air Force and examined how a program management 
approach and concepts can be applied to successfully manage services acquisition 
programs.  The findings showed that at the installation level, the acquisition of 
services was managed ad hoc as opposed to using a program management 
approach (Apte & Rendon, 2007).  The Air Force used some program management 
concepts at the installation level, but they were not institutionalized throughout the 
organization and were inconsistent in application (Apte & Rendon, 2007).  Apte and 
Rendon (2007) found that the traditional method used for the acquisition of services 
does not utilize a program management approach.  The traditional method lacked 
the disciplined use of project life cycles, integrated processes, designated program 
managers, integrated cross-functional teams, and an appropriate organizational 
structure. 
However, Apte and Rendon (2007) observed two organizations at the major-
command level that are applying innovative program management approaches in 
terms of organizational structure, project life cycle, integrated processes, and project 
teams for the successful acquisition of services.  The Air Education and Training 
Command (AETC) integrates critical processes by utilizing a disciplined and 
structured project life cycle for services acquisitions (Apte & Rendon, 2007).  Figure 
4 depicts the various phases within the AETC services project life cycle.  In addition, 
the AETC utilizes formal project teams for pre- and post-award activities and an 
integrated and matrixed organizational structure for the acquisition of support 
services (Apte & Rendon, 2007). Apte and Rendon (2007) found the Air Combat 
Command (ACC) Acquisition Management and Integration Center (AMIC) to be a 
fully integrated organization that employs the critical program management concepts 
discussed previously and includes all essential elements of an acquisition program 
office.  The AMIC provides integrated cradle-to-grave services acquisition support, 
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& Rendon, 2007).  Both the AETC and the AMIC successfully demonstrated a 
disciplined program management approach for the acquisition of services (Apte & 
Rendon, 2007). The research clearly demonstrated the viability and applicability of a 
program management approach to services acquisitions.  This program 
management approach provides a process-oriented framework for improved 
services acquisition outcomes. 
The activities and steps of the services contracting process are an integral 
component of the acquisition life cycle and are discussed in the next section.  
 
Figure 4. Services Project Life Cycle  
(Apte & Rendon, 2007) 
D. Services Contracting Process 
Contract management is an integral part of the defense acquisition 
management system and is defined as “the art and science of managing a 
contractual agreement throughout the contracting process” (Rendon & Snider, 
2008).  It is the means through which progress is made in the different phases of the 
acquisition life cycle.  The acquisition of all systems, goods, and services is done 
through contracting and is guided by the FAR.  The contracting process involves six 
primary phases conducted by both a buying organization (government) and a selling 
organization (contractor), each with a unique contract management perspective (see 
Figure 5 for an illustration).  The buyer’s perspective involves procurement planning, 
solicitation planning, solicitation, source selection, contract administration, and 
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involves similar phases that align with the buyer’s phases.  They are pre-sales 
activities, bid/no-bid decision-making, bid/proposal preparation, contract negotiation 
and formation, contract administration, and contract closeout/termination (Rendon & 
Snider, 2008).  Since this research is about the problems of services contracts within 
the U.S. government, we discuss only the buying (government) side of the 
contracting process. 
 
Figure 5. Procurement Process  
(Rendon & Snider, 2008) 
Phase 1 for the buyer is the procurement planning process and involves 
identifying which business needs can be met by reaching outside the organization 
for products and services (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  The government decides if 
procurement is really necessary and, if so, what, how much, and when to procure 
(Rendon & Snider, 2008).  Part of the planning process includes determining and 
defining the requirement and conducting market research (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  
Budgets and cost estimates are developed by both the buyer and seller, and 
preliminary work documents that delineate what services will be performed are 
written (Rendon & Snider, 2008). 
Phase 2 is solicitation planning.  The process involves determining which 
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as through negotiated proposals or sealed bids.  The type of contract (cost versus 
fixed price) and the contract/award strategy (lowest price versus price trade-off) are 
determined, criteria are developed for evaluating proposals, and the solicitation 
documentation is drawn up with contract terms and conditions (Rendon & Snider, 
2008). 
Phase 3 consists of the solicitation process.  Solicitation involves receiving 
bids and proposals from potential sellers (contractors).  In order to receive bids and 
increase competition, the government must advertise that there is a procurement 
opportunity (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  To do this, the contracting officer transmits a 
notice though the Government Point of Entry (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  After the 
government issues the solicitation, contractors prepare offers and attempt to 
persuade the government to accept their bid (Rendon & Snider, 2008). 
Phase 4 is the source selection and involves receiving all the bids or 
proposals from the sellers.  The proposals are then evaluated against the criteria 
previously set in the solicitation planning phase (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  Before 
the contract can be awarded, contract negotiations must occur between the 
government and the contractor to ensure that there is full agreement on cost, 
schedule, terms and conditions, and contractor performance (Rendon & Snider, 
2008). 
Phase 5, contract administration, is the most critical phase in the contracting 
process.  Both the government and the contractor conduct contract administration, 
each ensuring that performance from both sides meets the contractual obligations.  
Both parties attend a pre-performance conference to ensure that everyone 
understands the contract requirements and to discuss protocols for performance 
management, communication, and contract change management (Garrett & 
Rendon, 2005).  Any changes or modifications to the contract are executed, by 
authorized individuals only, through a formal process (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  The 
government closely monitors the contractor for quality, cost control, and 
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establishing a system to verify contractual conformance, assigning responsibility to 
check actual performance against requirements, ensuring that someone takes 
appropriate corrective action to significant variances, and maintaining all contract 
documentation (Garrett, 2011). 
Phase 6 is contract closeout or termination.  A government contract can end 
when the contractor successfully completes the job, when the government deems 
that it is convenient to terminate the contract, or when the contractor is in default 
(Rendon & Snider, 2008).  Regardless of why the contract is closed, all final 
administrative and legal matters must be completed (e.g., price adjustments and 
final payments made, claims settled, final products or services accepted, and past-
performance reports documented; Rendon & Snider, 2008). 
Recent studies on the contract management process in the DoD have 
indicated that, on the average, the process capability for the procurement  planning, 
solicitation planning, solicitation, and source selection phases are at the Structured 
level (Level 3), meaning that these processes are not fully integrated throughout the 
other functional areas of the agency, even though they are institutionalized.  They 
are also not measured or continuously improved.  Additionally, on the average, the 
process maturity level for the contract administration and contract closeout phases 
are at the Basic level (Level 2), meaning that these processes are not sufficiently 
institutionalized within the contracting department, even though they are somewhat 
established with some documentation, nor are these processes fully integrated 
throughout the other functional areas of the agency (Rendon, 2009, 2010, 2011). 
Each of the phases in the contracting process has activities performed by 
different individuals, each of whom has a stake in making sure that a 
project/program is performed in accordance with their organization’s regulations.  
These stakeholders can affect, or can be affected by, the accomplishment of their 
organization’s objectives (Freeman, 1984).  Stakeholder Theory describes this 
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E. Stakeholder Theory 
In the private sector, Stakeholder Theory is described as a corporation that 
identifies the people who have a stake or interest in that corporation and then acts 
accordingly to further the interests of those stakeholders (Cleland, 1986).  The main 
assumption of this theory is that the purpose of the corporation is to generate and 
dispense some form of wealth to various stakeholders, and that in order to achieve 
that purpose, all of the stakeholders cooperate (Freeman, 1984).  The word 
stakeholder originated in the 1960s at the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) with 
respect to the view that corporate management should only be concerned with the 
corporation’s stakeholders (Parmar, Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Purnell, & De Colle, 
2010).  Figure 6 illustrates Stakeholder Theory.  This theory, applied to government 
contracting, includes all stakeholders concerned with a certain project.  The project 
is the corporation, and the contractor and the various government roles on the 
acquisition team are the stakeholders.  That is a very broad view because both the 
contractor and the government have numerous individual stakeholders.  On the 
government side, there is the contracting officer (CO), the program manager (PM), 
the contracting officer representative (COR), the financial managers, and the 
customers who use the final product.  On the contractor side, there is the contracts 
manager, the contract specialist, the program manager, all subcontractors 
conducting business with that company, all suppliers who provide goods or services 
to that company, and various executives who have a vested interest in the success 
of the company.  This is a serious challenge for most managers because the 
stakeholder management approach views success as assessing the impact of every 
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Figure 6. A Schematic Model Illustrating the Proposed Stakeholder  
Theory of the Organization  
(Parmar et al., 2010) 
As stated earlier, the CO, PM, COR, financial manager, and customer are all 
government stakeholders on various projects that fall under their sphere of influence.  
As a result of their differing roles and responsibilities, their definitions of success 
cover a wide range and are often in conflict with each other in terms of importance of 
the factors measured. These stakeholders are described in detail in the next section. 
F. Stakeholders in DoD Services Contracts 
1. Contracting Officer 
The government obtains defense systems, equipment, and services from 
private-sector sources.  Since a contract is the primary means of acquisition, 
contract management is a set of important skills and knowledge that is of great value 
in defense acquisition projects (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  The FAR (2012) defines 
the CO as an agent of the government with the authority to enter into, administer, 
and/or terminate contracts and make related determinations and findings. Not only is 
the CO responsible for performing all contract functions, but the CO must also be 
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business advisor to the acquisition team, and the role’s specific responsibilities 
include forming a business strategy, participating in source selection, and possibly 
administering the resultant contract (DoD, 2011). He or she is the individual 
responsible for making sure that contracts are planned, executed, and closed out in 
accordance with agency regulations and statutory requirements (Rendon & Snider, 
2008).  COs must provide support to help achieve the contract objectives of cost, 
schedule, and performance. COs are the only agents with the ability to bind the 
government, and any individual who attempts to do so without delegated authority 
will make an unauthorized commitment (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  A detailed listing 
of contracting officer responsibilities is presented in the FAR (2012).   
2. Program/Project Manager 
The PM, also called a program director or a project manager, is the 
designated person responsible for accomplishing program objectives and ensuring 
that the desired results are achieved (Brown, 2010).  The PM has a very involved 
and important role in acquisition and procurement because he or she is held 
accountable for overall cost, schedule, and performance. The PM identifies, plans, 
and controls various aspects of the project/program.  These areas include, but are 
not limited to, delivery requirements, scheduling, conducting market research, and, 
normally, participating in source selection (DoD, 2011).  The PM should be the one 
most familiar with the program requirements (DoD, 2011). 
The PM must also have aptitude in contracting, financial management, and 
cost estimating.  And, more important, his or her management and leadership skills 
come into play when dealing with management challenges in day-to-day program 
execution (Wood, 2010).  The PM’s role is not an easy one, and the GAO has 
historically identified his or her lack of program management expertise as the 
primary cause of cost and schedule overruns in major acquisitions (GAO, 2005).  
Major weapons systems typically establish a program office; however, this is not 
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designated on a services contract, the contracting organization will have to work 
directly with the requiring organization (GAO, 2011a). 
3. Contracting Officer Representative 
Complex contracts for services require the addition of a technical expert, one 
who is intimately involved in the contract and has expert technical knowledge of the 
system or service being procured—this person is the COR.  The COR is the onsite 
technical specialist who assesses performance against standards and then records 
and reports this information to the CO (GAO, 2011a).  Only a U.S. government 
employee (civilian or military) or a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partner 
can fill the role of a COR; the CO should never fill this role (FAR, 2012).  The COR is 
formally appointed in writing by the contracting officer and must have specific 
qualifications and experience appropriate for the responsibility delegated to them 
(FAR, 2012).  The COR should be deeply involved in the entire acquisition and 
procurement process and will assist the contracting officer in developing the quality 
assurance plan, the technical requirements in the contract, and other pre-award 
activities.  The COR does not have the same authority as the contracting officer, so 
he or she cannot make any commitments or changes that affect the terms of the 
contract (FAR, 2012).  The COR assists the contracting officer and, along with the 
PM, becomes the focal point of the contract by monitoring all of its day-to-day 
aspects, as well as inspecting and accepting services (DAU, 2012).  A 
comprehensive list of the specific responsibilities of a COR can be found in the FAR 
(2012). 
4. Finance Manager 
The finance manager is another critical individual in contract management 
and is well versed in the financial management regulation (FMR). His or her role is to 
serve as the fiscal and budgetary advisor to the acquisition team (DoD, 2011).  The 
government finance manager is responsible for ensuring compliance with the 
statutory requirements of fiscal law (e.g., that proper authorization is granted for 
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prescribed by appropriation [time], and adequate funding is available [amount]; 
Rendon & Snider, 2008). 
5. Customer or End User 
The customer’s role in the acquisition process is to have a detailed 
knowledge of the requirement so that it can be clearly conveyed to contractors (DoD, 
2011).  The customer helps to determine whether trade-offs are available for a 
requirement and what these trade-offs are (DoD, 2011).  The customer plays a vital 
role in the acquisition process because, ultimately, he or she is a member of the 
team that drives how well the requirements document reflects their needs. 
The roles and responsibilities of each of the stakeholders differ, and as a 
result, their definitions of what constitutes a successful contract cover a wide range.  
Often these definitions are in conflict with each other in terms of the importance of 
the factors measured.  Identifying how each of the stakeholders determines success 
is vital to contract administration. In the next section, we discuss a study that 
identified seven factors that contribute to contract management success. 
G. Success Factors 
As described earlier in this chapter, there are six phases in the contract 
management process.  Of these six phases, only one is dedicated to contract 
administration.  GAO audits have consistently stated that contract administration 
needs to be improved.  Successful contract administration is dependent on effective 
contract management.  The question then becomes, what determines the success of 
a contract?  Rendon (2012) conducted a study asking this question specifically of 
DoD contracting.  In the study, Rendon surveyed eight defense agencies and two 
defense contractors over the course of four years.  Since the survey was designed 
for defense procurement, it was administered only to warranted contracting officers 
and individuals fully qualified in government contracting.  The results of the survey 
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Relationships, Processes, Resources, Leadership, Policy, and Requirements 
(Rendon, 2012). 
Rendon analyzed and summarized over 2,000 responses to the survey into 
the seven CSF categories. The Workforce factor in the study related to using proper 
staffing, hiring, and recruitment processes; having the right number of personnel; 
and having experienced, trained, and competent people.  Relationship responses 
involved communication, cooperation, and coordination at all levels within and 
between agencies.  The Processes category involved having a consistent, efficient, 
standardized, enforced, streamlined, and documented contracting process.  
Resource responses included the need for contract tracking tools, automated 
contract writing systems, technical support, and adequate travel funds.  Leadership 
responses related to the need for clear lines of authority, strong management 
support, and an empowered leadership.  The Policies category included the need for 
clear and concise guidance and regulations.  The final CSF, Requirements, related 
to timely procurement request packages, well-written statements of work, proper 
technical reviews, and adequate procurement funding (Rendon, 2012). 
A comparison of the DoD and industry/contractor responses shows some 
interesting differences. The DoD considers Workforce-related elements to be the 
most important success factor and Requirements-related elements to be the least 
important.  Industry responses showed that Processes were the most important 
factor and Policies were the least important.  The overall results of the study provide 
some thought-provoking insights into the differences between organizations and the 
disconnection that can occur when measuring and defining the success of a 
contract.  Agency Theory, described in the next paragraph, explains how and why 
this disconnection can occur. 
H. Agency Theory 
Agency Theory is aimed at the relationship that arises when one party (the 
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a certain outcome (Eisenhardt, 1989).  The theory mainly discusses these 
relationships and describes how the principal and the agent are engaged in 
cooperative behavior, but have differing goals and attitudes (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Agency Theory states that the principal can limit this difference by creating suitable 
incentives for the agent or creating sufficient means to monitor the agent (Hill & 
Jones, 1992).  When applying this theory to services contracts, the government is 
the principal and the contractor is the agent.  The government employs the 
contractor to perform specific tasks that are defined in great detail within the 
contract.  As described in the previous section, the government and contractor place 
differing importance on each of the success factors—and this is one of the 
cornerstone assumptions of Agency Theory (Hill & Jones, 1992).  The government 
and the contractor clearly have different goals in mind when executing a services 
contract.  The government’s goal is to have the services performed to a certain 
standard in the most effective way for a fair and reasonable price (FAR, 2012).  The 
contractor wishes to stay in business so its ultimate goal is to generate profit.  The 
government incentivizes the contractor by providing a fee—and in some cases, a 
price premium—in order to facilitate desired behaviors. 
Agency Theory describes the complex government-contractor relationship 
and how a principal and an agent can be involved in a cooperative effort but have 
differing goals and attitudes (Eisenhardt, 1989).  In the next section, we summarize 
this literature review and build a foundation for Chapter III. 
I. Summary 
This chapter introduced past and current literature on the deficiencies in 
services contracting, the need for a program management approach to the services 
contracting process, the current services contracting process, Stakeholder Theory 
and the various stakeholders on the acquisition team, critical success factors in 
government contract management, and the application of Agency Theory to the 
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The next chapter describes our research methodology, including the data 
collection process, a description of the participant commands, a list of the 
demographic questions asked, a brief description of the survey questions related to 
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III. Research Methodology 
A. Introduction 
In this chapter, we explain how we collected and analyzed our data in order to 
meet our objectives and answer the research questions discussed in Chapter I.  
Specifically, we discuss the creation of the survey and our analytical process.  We 
also include a description of the quantitative methods we used to analyze the data 
collected from the Navy contracting commands.  The objective of the research was 
to build upon the results found in a prior study, so that we could conduct a more in-
depth research analysis that further explains the factors that influence the success of 
services contracts.  We analyze the collected data quantitatively in order to draw 
conclusions about the definition and measurement of the success of services 
contracts, and compare the similarities and differences among the stakeholders 
surveyed. 
B. Overview 
Our research methodology included development of a survey instrument to 
collect empirical data for answering our research questions.  The survey was 
deployed to the various stakeholders at the participating commands.  We then 
analyzed the data using descriptive statistics to provide recommendations and 
conclusions. 
C. Survey Development 
Under the guidance of Professors Apte and Rendon, we developed a web-
based survey using the survey software Survey Monkey.  We first tested the survey 
on Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) contracting students for validity and 
cohesiveness, and used the survey to collect empirical data regarding the definition 
and measurement of services contracts.  The focus of the survey was on answering 
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 How do different stakeholders define successful services contracts 
within the Navy? 
 How do different stakeholders measure services contracts within the 
Navy? 
We took the qualitative results from previous research conducted by Miller, 
Newton, and D’Amato (2012) and then identified four metrics—process, cost, 
schedule, performance—about which we could ask further detailed questions. 
The survey questions consisted of seven demographic questions and 12 
research questions that addressed our two core research questions: 
1. What is your branch of Service or Service affiliation?  
2. What organization are you affiliated with?  
3. What is your current, primary, functional role?   
4. What is your DAWIA level certification? 
5. How many years of acquisition experience do you have? 
6. What type of services do you predominantly procure? 
7. What broad category do the majority of your contracts fall into? 
8. How do you define a successful service contract? 
9. How do you measure the success of a service contract? 
The purpose of the demographic questions was so that we could differentiate 
our results and compare and contrast to determine trends across different areas, 
such as functional role, DAWIA level, and type of service provided.   
The purpose of the core research questions was to establish the importance 
of different factors when defining and measuring the success of services contracts.  
We asked several questions related to the contracting process, as well as questions 
concerning different outcomes such as cost, schedule, and performance.  Our 
process questions involved, but were not limited to, the level of administrative load, 
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survey questions associated with cost dealt with overruns, fair and reasonable 
pricing and profit, as well as cost control.  The schedule questions were related to 
meeting major milestones and a timely completion of the contract.  Performance 
questions were connected to customer satisfaction, adherence to the statement of 
work (SOW), and reliance on COR reports.  We also used these factors to 
differentiate responses in order to determine trends.   
The survey provides specific questions related to how commands define the 
success of a services contract.  The first two questions ask participants to rank 
various definitions relating to the four metrics in order of most important (1) to least 
important (5). The next three main questions ask participants to rate definition 
statements relating to process, schedule, cost, and performance.  These questions 
use a Likert scale asking level of agreement, importance, and amount of time 
devoted by the participants.  The Likert scale had a range of (1) to (5), with (1) 
representing a negative response and (5) representing a positive response. 
The survey also asks specific questions related to how commands measure 
the success of a services contract.  The first two questions ask participants to rank 
various measurements relating to the four metrics in order of most important (1) to 
least important (5). The last question in the section asks participants to rate on a 
Likert scale how often the organization conducts certain actions that pertain to the 
measurement of success concerning process, schedule, cost, and performance. 
Finally, the survey includes a final question soliciting any general comments 
that the participants may wish to share regarding the topic of defining and measuring 
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Figure 7. Diagram of Survey Questions 
D. Survey Deployment 
We conducted a survey with the major stakeholders in the services 
acquisition process.  This included the PMs, COs, CORs, contractors, and end users 
associated with the following contracting commands: the Fleet Logistics Center 
(FLC) Philadelphia, FLC Jacksonville, FLC Norfolk, FLC Puget Sound, FLC San 
Diego, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), Military Sealift Command (MSC), 
and Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR).   
1. Participating Commands 
NAVSEA’s mission is to engineer, build, buy, and maintain ships, submarines, 
and their combat systems that meet the United States Naval Fleet’s current and 
future operational requirements.  As the largest of the Navy’s five system 
commands, the NAVSEA has a $30 billion fiscal year budget, accounting for 25% of 
the Navy’s entire budget.  To accomplish their mission, the NAVSEA manages 
billions of dollars in annual foreign military sales and 150 acquisition programs.  It 
plays a critical role in the Navy Enterprise and strives to be an efficient provider of 
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SPAWAR is one of three major Department of Navy acquisition commands.  
Its mission is to design, develop, and deliver advanced communications and 
information dominance systems to the fleet.  It supports the full life cycle of product 
and services delivery, which includes research, engineering, acquisition and 
deployment, and operations and logistics support services. The SPAWAR’s products 
and services “transform ships, aircraft and vehicles from individual platforms into 
integrated battle forces, enhancing information dominance and awareness among 
Navy, Marine, joint forces, federal agencies and international allies” (SPAWAR, 
n.d.).  In order to accomplish their mission, SPAWAR partners and contracts with 
industry, including small businesses, to get the best value for information 
technology.  In 2010, they obligated $1.21 billion to small businesses and $4.84 
billion to large businesses (Esaias, 2011).  
The MSC is composed of over 100 non-combatant, civilian-crewed ships.  Its 
mission is to support our nation by replenishing U.S. naval ships, moving military 
cargo and supplies, strategically prepositioning combat cargo at sea around the 
world, and conducting specialized missions.  The MSC is organized around five 
mission areas: combat logistics force, special mission, propositioning, services 
support, and sealift.  These worldwide operations are financed through the Navy 
Working Capital Fund and the Transportation Working Capital Fund.  Their budget of 
about $3 billion is reimbursed by direct appropriations or by funds transfers by MSC 
customers (www.msc.navy.mil). 
The FLCs Philadelphia, Jacksonville, Norfolk, Puget Sound, and San Diego 
are just some of the 12 total subordinate commands of the Naval Supply Systems 
Command (NAVSUP).  NAVSUP as a whole provides 25 distinct products and 
services, ranging from supply chain management, warehousing, and foreign military 
sales, to postal services and quality of life programs (NAVSUP, n.d.).  Each 
subordinate command is responsible for providing logistics, business and support 
services, and products to United States naval activities and other joint, civilian, and 
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through logistics by teaming with regional partners and customers to provide supply 
chain management, procurement, contracting and transportation services, technical 
and customer support, defense fuel products and worldwide movement of personal 
property” (NAVSUP, n.d.).  They are given contracting authority by NAVSUP, 
contracting for over $4 billion annually in supplies, services, and equipment, and 
make about 120,000 individual purchases (GlobalSecurity.org, n.d.). 
E. Analytical Process 
We chose ranking and Likert scale questions to gain quantitative data for our 
research and to narrow down responses from various stakeholders.  We reported 
and analyzed the mean of Likert scale responses and all responses that received a 
rank of (1) or (2).  We examined the data to determine trends and identify 
correlations.  Initially, we took an overarching view of the responses, including all 
stakeholders across all demographics.  We conducted further analysis by breaking 
down the demographics into major stakeholders, DAWIA level certification, and type 
of service procured.  In Chapter IV, we present this quantitative data in graphical 
format.  
F. Summary 
In Chapter III, we identified the Navy contracting organizations we surveyed, 
how we created the survey, and how we collected and analyzed data.  In Chapter IV, 
we present the results of the data and conduct an analysis of the findings, and in 
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IV. Survey Instrument, Results, and Analysis 
A. Introduction 
In this chapter, we examine the survey responses.  The objective of this 
research was to examine different stakeholders’ definitions and measurements of 
successful services contracts.  We designed a survey of 19 questions and presented 
them to the major stakeholders in the services acquisition process.  The survey was 
distributed to the following activities:  NAVSEA, SPAWAR, MSC, FLC Philadelphia, 
FLC Jacksonville, FLC Norfolk, FLC Puget Sound, and FLC San Diego.  Our 
response rate is shown in Table 1.  We received such a small number of responses 
from requirements managers, financial managers, contractors, and customers that 
their responses were not incorporated in this report for analysis purposes.  These 
respondents are combined in the “other” category in Table 1. 








PROGRAM MANAGER/PROJECT OFFICER 94 15 16% 
CONTRACTING OFFICER 
REPRESENTATIVE 104 27 26% 
CONTRACTING OFFICER/ CONTRACT 
SPECIALIST 280 126 45% 
AGGREGATE (PM, COR, PCO)  478 168 35% 
OTHER 365 10 2.7% 
TOTAL  843 178 21% 
 
When we examine the ranking questions in this section, the term “most 
important” refers to the number of factors that received the ranking of (1) or (2).  We 
felt that this was the most accurate way to capture the nature of our participants’ 
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ranked (1) every time, but they feel that process factors are also very important so 
they may have responded with a rank of (2).  We believe that this is the most 
effective way to report and analyze the results when ranking is concerned. 
B. Aggregate Findings  
1. Defining the Success of a Service Contract  
We first took an overarching view of our survey findings.  We did not 
differentiate between functional roles, DAWIA levels of certification, contract type, or 
organization.  However, we did separate our findings under the broad categories of 
process and outcome.  Outcome results included the questions associated with cost, 
schedule, and performance.  Our survey resulted in 168 respondents, spanning 
major stakeholders. The Likert scale responses were assigned a value of (1) through 
(5), with the higher value representing a favorable response.  We examined the 
means of each set of Likert scale–type questions and found that, when defining the 
success of a services contract, outcomes are considered slightly more important 
than processes.  The overall mean with relation to outcomes was 4.08, while 
process responses produced a mean of 3.97.  Our findings are displayed graphically 
in Figure 8. 
We then separated our findings further within the broad category of outcomes 
to the narrower categories of cost, schedule, and performance.  Performance-related 
questions resulted in the highest mean, 4.29, while cost-related questions produced 
a mean of 4.03, and schedule-related questions produced a mean of 3.93. 
One hundred and sixty-eight respondents were asked to rank different factors 
related to defining the success of a service contract.  These questions also dealt 
with different aspects of processes and outcomes.  Of the 172 respondents, 40% felt 
that process-related factors were the most important.  Sixty percent felt that 
outcome-related factors were the most important. The distribution of highest ranked 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 37 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Breaking down the outcome-related factors further, 15% of respondents felt 
that cost-related factors were the most important, 19% felt that schedule-related 
factors were most important, and 26% felt that performance-related factors were 
most important. 
 
Figure 8. Means of Aggregate Stakeholder Definitions of Success 
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2. Measuring the Success of a Service Contract 
Our survey also had participants rate on the Likert scale the various degrees 
of importance, and the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with, various factors 
related to how they measure the success of a service contract.  Again, these factors 
related to either processes or outcomes.  The overall Likert scale mean for all 
demographics with relation to processes was 2.48, and outcomes displayed an 
overall mean of 3.71.  Clearly, outcomes are more important to our participants as a 
whole.  Our findings are displayed graphically in Figure 10. 
If we look at the distinct factors within the outcome category—cost, schedule, 
and performance—the overall Likert means were 3.96, 3.84, and 3.30, respectively. 
One hundred and sixty-eight respondents were asked to rank different factors 
related to measuring the success of a service contract.  Of the 168 respondents, 
46% felt that process-related factors were the most important.  Fifty-four percent felt 
that outcome-related factors were the most important. The distribution of highest 
ranked responses is displayed in Figure 11. 
 Breaking down the outcome-related factors further, 19% of respondents felt 
that cost-related factors were the most important, 12% felt that schedule-related 
factors were most important, and 23% felt that performance-related factors were 
most important. All results for aggregate stakeholders are displayed in table format 
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Figure 10. Means of Aggregate Stakeholder Measurements of Success 
 
Figure 11. Aggregate Stakeholder Ranking of Measurements of Success 
C. Findings by Stakeholder 
While examining our data, we found that we obtained the most responses 
from certain functional roles.  PMs, CORs, and COs/Contract specialists accounted 
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of these functional areas defines success with regards to service contracts.  COs 
and contract specialists were grouped under one category and from now on the term 
“CO” encompasses both demographics.  We differentiated by functional role and 
made no other demographic distinctions.  Our data include functional roles across all 
DAWIA levels, contract types, and organizations. 
1. PMs’, CORs’, and COs’/Contract Specialists’ Definitions of 
Success 
a. Program Managers’ Definition of Success 
With regard to the Likert scale ratings from PMs, we found, based on the 15 
responses we received, that this group considers outcomes slightly more important 
than processes when defining success.  When defining the success of a service 
contract, PMs responded with a mean rating of 3.87 on process-related factors, and 
a mean of 4.13 when responding to questions with outcome-related factors.  This is 
a small range, but PMs seem to feel that outcomes are somewhat more important 
when defining the success of a service contract.  Our results are displayed 
graphically in Figure 12, with outcomes broken out with respect to cost, schedule, 
and performance. 
Fifteen respondents were asked to rank different factors related to defining 
the success of a service contract.  Of the 15 respondents, 41% felt that process-
related factors were the most important.  Fifty-nine percent felt that outcome-related 
factors were the most important. The distribution of highest ranked responses is 
displayed in Figure 13. 
Breaking down the outcome-related factors further, 11% of respondents felt 
that cost-related factors were the most important, 22% felt that schedule-related 
factors were most important, and 27% felt that performance-related factors were 
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Figure 12. PM Definitions of Success 
 
Figure 13. PM Ranking of Definitions of Success 
b. Contracting Officer Representatives’ Definition of Success 
We received 27 responses from CORs to Likert scale–based questions 
related to their definitions of the success of a service contract.  Process-related 
factors received a mean rating of 3.97, while outcome-related factors produced a 
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relatively low, and CORs also appear to favor outcomes over processes when 
defining the success of a service contract.  Our findings are displayed graphically in 
Figure 14. 
Twenty-seven respondents were asked to rank different factors related to 
defining the success of a service contract.  Of the 27 respondents, 39% felt that 
process-related factors were the most important. Sixty-one percent felt that 
outcome-related factors were the most important. The distribution of highest ranked 
responses is displayed in Figure 15. 
 Breaking down the outcome-related factors further, 18% of respondents felt 
that cost-related factors were the most important, 19% felt that schedule-related 
factors were most important, and 24% felt that performance-related factors were 
most important. 
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Figure 15. COR Ranking of Definitions of Success 
c. Contracting Officers’ and Contract Specialists’ Definition of 
Success 
We received responses from 126 self-identified COs/contract specialists 
when we asked them to rate their definitions of success on the Likert scale.  Our 
data show that process-related factors achieved an overall mean rating of 3.97, and 
outcome-related factors received an overall mean rating of 4.15.  These means are 
again extremely close and suggest that COs only slightly favor outcomes versus 
processes when defining the success of a service contract.  Our results are 
displayed graphically in Figure 16. 
On the Likert scale, COs/contract specialists rated cost-related factors with a 
mean of 3.98, they rated schedule-related factors with a mean of 3.91, and they 
rated performance-related factors with a mean of 4.27. 
One hundred and twenty-six respondents were asked to rank different factors 
related to defining the success of a service contract.  Of the 126 respondents, 40% 
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outcome-related factors were the most important. The distribution of highest ranked 
responses is displayed in Figure 17. 
 Breaking down the outcome-related factors further, 17% of respondents felt 
that cost-related factors were the most important, 15% felt that schedule-related 
factors were most important, and 28% felt that performance-related factors were 
most important. 
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Figure 17. CO Ranking of Definitions of Success 
2. PMs’, CORs’, COs’, and Contract Specialists’ Measurement of 
Success 
a. Program Managers’ Measurement of Success 
PMs provided 15 responses when asked to respond to Likert scale questions 
related to how they measure the success of a service contract.  PMs’ ratings of 
process-related factors received an overall mean of 2.52.  However, outcomes 
produced a mean of 3.78 on the Likert scale.  This shows that PMs heavily rely on 
outcomes rather than processes to measure the success of a service contract. Our 
findings are displayed graphically in Figure 18. 
On the Likert scale, cost-related factors showed a mean of 4.15, schedule-
related factors received a mean of 3.92, and performance-related factors received a 
mean of 3.25. 
Fifteen respondents were asked to rank different factors related to measuring 
the success of a service contract.  Of the 15 respondents, 43% felt that process-
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factors were the most important. The distribution of highest ranked responses is 
displayed in Figure 19. 
Breaking down the outcome-related factors further, 13% of respondents felt 
that cost-related factors were the most important, 14% felt that schedule-related 
factors were most important, and 30% felt that performance-related factors were 
most important. 
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Figure 19. PM Ranking of Measurements of Success 
b. Contracting Officer Representatives’ Measurement of 
Success  
CORs provided 27 responses when asked to respond to Likert scale 
questions related to how they measure the success of a service contract.  Process-
related factors received an overall mean of 2.76 when rated by this functional area.  
However, outcomes produced a mean of 3.77 on the Likert scale.  This shows that 
CORs also find outcomes significantly more important than processes when 
measuring the success of a service contract.  Our results are displayed graphically 
in Figure 20. 
Cost-related factors showed a mean of 4.23, schedule-related factors showed 
a mean of 4.08, and performance-related factors received a mean of 2.99. 
Twenty-seven respondents were asked to rank different factors related to 
measuring the success of a service contract.  Of the 27 respondents, 39% felt that 
process-related factors were the most important.  Sixty-one percent felt that 
outcome-related factors were the most important. The distribution of highest ranked 
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Breaking down the outcome-related factors further, 28% of respondents felt 
that cost-related factors were the most important, 9% felt that schedule-related 
factors were most important, and 24% felt that performance-related factors were 
most important. 
 
Figure 20. COR Measurements of Success 
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c.  Contracting Officers’ and Contract Specialists’ 
Measurement of Success 
COs/contract specialists provided 126 Likert scale responses when asked 
how they measure the success of a service contract.  Process-related factors 
received an overall mean rating of 2.41 from COs/contract specialists.  Conversely, 
outcome-related factors were rated with a mean of 3.77.  Our results are displayed 
graphically in Figure 22. 
Within the outcome-related factors, cost showed a mean of 3.98, schedule 
received a mean rating of 3.98, and performance a mean of 3.47.  This shows that 
COs and contract specialists are aligned with PMs and CORs when measuring the 
success of a service contract.  All three functional roles agree that outcome-related 
factors heavily outweigh process-related factors when measuring success. 
One hundred and twenty-six respondents were asked to rank different factors 
related to measuring the success of a service contract.  Of the 126 respondents, 
49% felt that process-related factors were the most important.  Fifty-one percent felt 
that outcome-related factors were the most important. The distribution of highest 
ranked responses is displayed in Figure 23. 
Breaking down the outcome-related factors further, 17% felt that cost-related 
factors were the most important, 11% felt that schedule-related factors were most 
important, and 23% felt that performance-related factors were most important. All 
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Figure 22. CO Measurements of Success 
 
Figure 23. CO Ranking of Measurements of Success 
D. Findings by DAWIA Level 
We separated our data on DAWIA certification levels in order to examine and 
analyze the results.  This analysis is strictly divided among DAWIA levels and 
contains no other demographic differentiation.  Of the 168 participants, 85% had a 
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for certification rise in conjunction with the level.  A majority of data collected on 
Level I participants showed that these participants had fewer than three years of 
experience in an acquisition-related billet.  Level II participants had a more diverse 
range of experience with the majority having more than four years, but fewer than 
eight years of experience in an acquisition-related billet.  Level III participants also 
showed a diverse range of experience, and, as expected, contained participants with 
more than 19 years of experience in an acquisition-related billet. 
1. DAWIA-Certified Participants’ Definition of Success 
When differentiated by DAWIA level, Level I and II respondents showed a 
slightly higher rating than Level III participants on Likert scale factor-related 
questions.  However, the responses concerning processes versus outcomes showed 
little difference within each level.  Level I participants displayed a mean rating on 
process and outcome factors of 4.00 and 4.14, respectively.  Level II participants 
displayed a mean rating on process and outcome factors of 4.16 and 4.17, 
respectively.  Level III participants displayed a mean rating on process and outcome 
factors of 3.79 and 4.01, respectively.  This shows that while distinct levels may rate 
processes and outcomes differently, they feel that outcomes are slightly more 
important than processes.  Yet, processes are still considered important when 
defining the success of service contracts.  Our results are displayed graphically 
across all certification levels in Figure 24. 
One hundred and forty-two respondents with a DAWIA certification provided 
responses when asked to rank definitions of success concerning a service contract.  
Each certification level provided similar answers within each of the categories on 
processes and outcomes.  Of the Level I respondents, 42% felt that process-related 
factors were the most important, while 58% felt that outcome-related factors were 
the most important.  Of the Level II respondents, 39% felt that process-related 
factors were the most important, while 61% felt that outcome-related factors were 
the most important.  Of the Level III respondents, 40% felt that process-related 
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the most important.  Again, this shows that these particular demographics tend to 
use outcomes when defining the success of a service contract.  The distribution of 
the responses is shown in Figure 25. 
 
Figure 24. Definitions of Success Across DAWIA Levels 
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2. DAWIA-Certified Participants’ Measurement of Success 
Our data suggest that when measuring the success of a service contract, the 
various DAWIA levels rely heavily on outcome-related factors rather than process-
related factors.  Level I participants displayed a mean rating on process and 
outcome factors of 2.20 and 3.76, respectively.  Level II participants displayed a 
mean rating on process and outcome factors of 2.63 and 3.86, respectively.  Level III 
participants displayed a mean rating on process and outcome factors of 2.22 and 
3.72, respectively.  Our results are displayed graphically across all certification levels 
in Figure 26. 
One hundred and forty-six respondents with a DAWIA certification provided 
146 responses when asked to rank measurement factors of success concerning a 
service contract.  There is a little more diversity between the levels, but all favor 
outcomes over processes.  Forty-nine percent of Level I respondents felt that 
processes were most important, with 51% favoring outcomes.  Forty-eight percent of 
Level II respondents felt that processes were most important, with 52% favoring 
outcomes.  Forty-three percent of Level III respondents felt that processes were 
most important, with 57% favoring outcomes.  The distribution of the responses is 
shown in Figure 27.  All results by DAWIA level are displayed in table format in 
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Figure 26. Measurement of Success Across DAWIA Levels 
 
Figure 27. Ranking of Measurements of Success Across DAWIA Levels 
E. Data Analysis by Type of Service 
While examining our data, we found that we obtained the majority of 
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responses, the equipment-related service portfolio grouping accounted for 72 
responses and the knowledge-based service portfolio groupings for 77 responses.  
Given the majority of responses from these two groups, we further analyzed them to 
identify trends across service types.  The equipment-related service portfolio 
grouping includes the procurement of maintenance, repair and overhaul, equipment 
modification, installation, and quality control services.  The knowledge-based 
services portfolio grouping is composed of professional and administrative services, 
engineering management, program management, logistics management, and 
education and training.  Further demographic breakdown of the two groups shows 
40% of knowledge-based service participants were involved with cost 
reimbursement–type contracts compared to only 6% for equipment-related services. 
The higher percentage of cost reimbursement–type contracts for knowledge-based 
service participants is most likely due to the increased challenges and uncertainties 
in defining requirements associated with these types of services.  Equipment-related 
services are generally more concrete in terms of requirements definitions and would 
be more suitable for a fixed-price contractual instrument. 
 In this section, we examine and compare how stakeholders involved with 
equipment-related services and knowledge-based services define and measure 
success with regards to services contracts.  We only differentiated by type of service 
and made no other demographic distinctions for mean and ranking results.  Our data 
include the two predominant types of services procured across all functional roles, 
DAWIA levels, contract types, and organizations. 
1. Specific Service Type Definition of Success 
In response to our questions asking participants to classify different factors 
related to defining the success of a service contract, we received 149 responses 
from participants who work on knowledge-based and equipment-related services. 
We received 72 responses from participants who worked on equipment-related 
services and 77 responses from those involved with knowledge-based services.  
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service participants rated both processes and outcomes higher on all Likert scale 
questions than knowledge-based service participants.  Equipment-related 
participants displayed a mean rating on process and outcome factors of 4.05 and 
4.10, respectively.  Knowledge-based participants displayed a mean rating on 
process and outcome factors of 3.92 and 4.02, respectively.  This shows that 
participants segregated by type of service may rate processes and outcomes slightly 
differently; however, they both indicated that outcomes are slightly more important 
than processes for defining success on Likert scale questions.  Our results are 
displayed graphically by type of service in Figure 28. 
Seventy-two respondents involved with equipment-related services provided 
responses when asked to rank definitions of success concerning a service contract.  
The questions asked of participants dealt with different aspects that aligned with 
process- and outcome-related groupings. Of the 72 respondents, 42% believed that 
process factors are most important, while 58% felt that outcomes more accurately 
define the success of a service contract. 
Breaking down the outcome-related factors further, 15% felt that cost-related 
factors were the most important, 18% felt that schedule-related factors were most 
important, and 25% felt that performance-related factors were most important. 
Seventy-seven respondents involved with knowledge-based services 
provided responses when asked to rank definitions of success concerning a service 
contract. Of the 77 respondents, 39% believed that process factors are most 
important, while 61% felt that outcomes more accurately defined the success of a 
service contract.  The results show that equipment-related service participants rated 
processes higher and outcomes lower than knowledge-based participants, but both 
groups indicated that outcomes are more important than processes for defining 
success, based on their responses to ranking questions.  The distribution of highest 
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Breaking down the outcome-related factors further, 16% of respondents felt 
that cost-related factors were the most important, 18% felt that schedule-related 
factors were most important, and 28% felt that performance-related factors were 
most important. 
 
Figure 28. Definitions of Success by Service Type 
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2. Specific Service Type Measurements of Success  
In measuring the success for different types of services, the equipment-
related service participants rated processes much higher on Likert scale questions 
than knowledge-based service participants.  Equipment-related service participants 
also rated outcomes as being of lower importance than did knowledge-based service 
participants.  Equipment-related participants displayed a mean rating on process 
and outcome factors of 2.68 and 3.76, respectively.  Knowledge-based participants 
displayed a mean rating on process and outcome factors of 2.29 and 3.82, 
respectively.  The results show that equipment-related service participants rated 
processes higher and outcomes lower than knowledge-based participants, but both 
groups indicated that outcomes are more important than processes for measuring 
success, based on their responses to Likert scale questions.  Our results are 
displayed graphically by type of service in Figure 30. 
In response to our questions asking participants to classify different factors 
related to measuring the success of a service contract, we received 149 responses 
from participants who work on knowledge-based and equipment-related services.  
The questions dealt with process- and outcome-related groupings. Of the 72 
equipment-related responses to our ranking questions, process-related factors were 
ranked most important 44% of the time, while outcome-related factors were ranked 
as most important 56% of the time. 
Breaking down the outcome-related factors further, 21% of respondents felt 
that cost-related factors were the most important, 12% felt that schedule-related 
factors were most important, and 21% felt that performance-related factors were 
most important. 
Forty-eight percent of the 77 respondents associated with knowledge-based 
services felt that process-related factors were the most important when measuring 
success.  Fifty-two percent of respondents felt that outcome-related factors were the 
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processes lower and outcomes higher than knowledge-based participants, but both 
groups indicated that outcomes are more important than processes for measuring 
success, based on their responses to our ranking questions.  The distribution of 
highest ranked responses is displayed in Figure 31. 
Breaking down the outcome-related factors further, 16% of respondents felt 
that cost-related factors were the most important, 11% felt that schedule-related 
factors were most important, and 25% felt that performance-related factors were 
most important.  All results by service type are displayed in table format in Appendix 
A, Table A8. 
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Figure 31. Ranking of Measurement of Success by Service Type 
F. Analysis 
1. Analysis of Aggregate Survey Responses 
The research findings from our overall survey show that when asked to 
respond on a Likert scale, different stakeholders find all aspects of processes and 
outcomes important when defining the success of a service contract.  The means of 
the responses we collected are very close, and it does not seem that, as a whole, 
our population favors process or outcome when defining success.  This is due to the 
nature of Likert scale questions.  When asked if something such as cost overruns, 
major milestones, or a lack of protests is important, all stakeholders will invariably 
say “yes.”  That is why the overall mean of all responses, for both outcomes and 
processes, is fairly high at 4.03.  When respondents were forced to rank, the 
responses differed and outcome-related responses received a high rank of 1 or 2 
60% of the time.  This is because outcomes, such as keeping on schedule and 
adhering to a budget, are easy to define and understand.  Process-related factors 
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The findings also demonstrate that when measuring the success of a service 
contract, all stakeholders tend to focus on outcomes and do not take into 
consideration the processes; this was true for both Likert scale responses and 
ranking responses.  This is very evident in the Likert scale responses, where none of 
the process-related factors showed a mean of 3 or more.  When forced to rank the 
different factors with respect to measuring success, the results were similar to 
defining success, with 56% of “most important” responses falling under the 
outcomes category. 
In general our findings from the “other” category mirrored our aggregate 
results.  While there were only 10 responses, all respondents felt that outcomes 
were the most important factor when defining and measuring the success of a 
service contract.  We found that our stakeholders in this category rated and ranked 
processes extremely low in both defining and measuring the success of a service 
contract.  This is because these stakeholders are not terribly burdened by 
administration and other process-related factors so they feel that these factors are 
not important.  For example, a contractor or end user does not necessarily conduct 
market research or choose the appropriate contract type.  However, they are very 
concerned with staying within cost, keeping up with schedule, and maintaining a 
high level of performance. 
2. Analysis Across Stakeholders 
When examining how different stakeholders define the success of a service 
contract, we found that PMs, CORs, COs, and contract specialists all agree that 
outcome is slightly more important than process, based on their ratings of separate 
factors on a Likert scale.  Each functional role rated outcome slightly over 4.00, while 
rating processes just below 4.00.  The mean of the functional roles combined was 
3.94 for processes and 4.11 for outcomes.  Within outcome, performance-related 
factors received the highest average rating, while schedule-related factors received 
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schedule, to cost, to performance.  A comparison of our Likert scale findings for 
defining success across functional roles is displayed graphically in Figure 32. 
When stakeholders were asked to rank different factors concerning their 
definition of success, we found that there was clear agreement that outcomes are 
more important than processes.  There is, however, some disagreement within the 
outcome factors of cost, schedule, and performance. CORs feel that cost is the most 
important factor, while PMs, COs, and specialists placed performance at the top of 
their rankings.  Examined collectively, the major stakeholders provided 168 
responses when ranking their definition of the success of a service contract.  Sixty 
percent of respondents felt that outcome-related factors were most important, while 
40% felt that process-related factors were the most important when defining 
success.  The distribution of highest ranked responses is displayed in Figure 33. 
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Figure 33. Major Stakeholder Ranking of Definitions of Success 
According to our data, stakeholders also tend to measure success in the 
same way.  When asked to rate different factors on the Likert scale related to 
stakeholders’ measures of success, all respondents agreed that outcomes far 
outweigh processes.  When looking at the mean across stakeholders, processes 
received a rating of 2.56, while outcomes received a rating of 3.78.  Within outcome-
related factors, stakeholders showed an upward trend from performance, to 
schedule, to cost.  A comparison of our findings for defining success on the Likert 
scale across functional roles is displayed graphically in Figure 34. 
Our ranking data show that, again, major stakeholders prefer outcome-related 
factors when measuring the success of service contracts.  When examined in 
aggregate, the major stakeholders provided 168 responses to our ranking questions.  
Of these responses, 43% of respondents felt process factors were most important, 
while 57% favored factors related to outcomes.  The distribution of highest ranked 
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Figure 34. Measurement of Success Across Major Stakeholders 
 
Figure 35. Major Stakeholder Ranking of Measurements of Success 
The data collected from the major stakeholders are similar to our cumulative 
findings. That is to be expected, considering they made up 87% of our total 
population.  The Likert scale responses for definitions of success were, again, 
relatively high and this is due to the reason explained earlier.  It is interesting that in 
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stakeholders.  In previous research (Miller et al., 2012), CORs listed performance as 
more important than cost when defining and measuring success.  This is probably 
due to the open-ended nature of the questions asked in previous research.  Our 
survey may have brought to light issues or factors that CORs had never thought of 
before. 
Another interesting result is that COs tend to place nearly equal importance 
on processes and outcomes when forced to rank factors concerning measuring 
success.  This is probably due to the administrative nature of the COs’ role.  For 
example, their functional role has to deal with modifications, COR reports, and 
exercising options.  PMs and CORs are not overly concerned with processes and 
are focused on the requirement and outcomes.  The data reflect this fact. 
It is of note that every demographic consistently rated processes significantly 
higher on the Likert scale when defining success versus measuring success.  We 
feel that this is because stakeholders view measures as a tangible entity associated 
with post-award functions.  Measures such as cost, schedule, and performance are 
fairly straightforward in as much as either a goal is met or it is not. Processes such 
as communication flow and overall management are more obscure and subjective.  
The stakeholders rated processes higher for defining success because they are 
closely associated with mainly pre-award functions.  Processes such as choosing 
the correct contract type and appropriate proposal evaluation are crucial for 
success.  Because these are pre-award activities, it is easier to define success than 
to measure it. 
We performed a statistical analysis across the major stakeholders to 
determine if there was a significant difference between the ratings on the Likert 
scale.  We first performed an F-test two sample for variances to determine the 
appropriate t-test to perform.  In all instances, we found an equal variance among 
stakeholders.  The only significant difference we discovered was between the CORs 
and COs/specialists when measuring success.  This could be due to the fact that 
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success of a service contract.  CORs are also likely to view a protest as a serious 
issue when measuring success because it results in a delay of execution and the 
CORs cannot perform their duties. There was no statistically significant difference 
between any other of the stakeholders on the Likert scale.  Tables from statistical 
analysis are located in Appendix B. 
3. Analysis Across DAWIA Levels 
After further assessment, we noted that a majority of the DAWIA level-
certified personnel were mostly COs, so their results somewhat mirror that 
demographic.  It is of note that when we analyzed Likert scale responses, Level III 
personnel tend to provide lower responses on the scale than Levels I and II when 
defining success.  Level III personnel generally have more experience than Levels I 
and II, and that may be the reason for this trend.  Seventy-two percent of Level III-
certified respondents reported having 10 or more years of experience, and this 
demographic also had the most divergence from the CO role.  The level of 
experience can explain the low Likert score for the process factors for participants 
with a Level III certification.  Because those respondents have 10 or more years of 
experience, the processes have become routine and they view administration and 
communication as standard, whereas Level I and II respondents have relatively low 
experience and believe that processes are more important.  Another reason that 
more experienced stakeholders view processes as less important is because, as a 
result of their experience, they have seen the outcomes of fully completed contracts 
whereas more junior personnel may have only dealt with award and administration.  
There is the possibility that they have never conducted close out on a contract to 
actually see the true outcome, and, as a result, Level I and II stakeholders believe 
that processes are more important than do Level III stakeholders. 
4. Analysis by Type of Service 
The findings based on type of service showed no substantial deviation for 
defining the success of a services contract.  Both equipment-related and knowledge-
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responses to the Likert scale questions.  Ranking questions for definitions of 
success showed outcomes as more important than processes for both groups and 
corroborated the Likert scale mean findings.  Both Likert scale and ranking question 
results showed performance to be the most important component of outcomes. For 
example, performance results for the two groups had means of 4.28 and 4.24, 
compared to 3.97 and 3.82 for schedule.  Ranking questions showed 25%–28% for 
performance and 18% for schedule across both groups.  Perhaps ranking results, 
due to the limitation of choices, provide the most precise definitions of success.  
When participants were forced to rank, they emphasized the importance of 
outcomes (cost, schedule, and performance) over processes more definitively when 
defining the characteristics of successful service contracts. 
The findings for measuring success also showed no substantial deviation 
based on type of service.  Both equipment-related and knowledge-based groups 
rated outcomes significantly higher than processes on the Likert scale questions.  
Ranking questions for measuring success showed outcomes as more important than 
processes for both groups and corroborated the Likert scale mean findings.  
Participants who work on equipment-related services rated cost as more important 
and performance as less important on both Likert and ranking questions compared 
to knowledge-based participants.  This finding seems to indicate that for knowledge-
based services, stakeholders were more willing to trade cost for enhanced 
performance.  This may be attributable to the highly specialized and technical nature 
of functions such as engineering management and program management, which the 
government lacks the crucial internal capacity to perform. 
G. Summary 
In this chapter, we presented and analyzed the various responses that we 
received to our survey questions.  First, we looked at responses from all 
demographics and determined that all stakeholders believe processes and 
outcomes are important when defining the success of a service contract.  Our results 
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importance on outcomes rather than processes.  We then differentiated the 
demographics based on the highest percentage of responses.  These demographics 
included the major stakeholders, DAWIA certification level, and type of service 
procured.  In all instances, we found that outcomes outweighed processes when 
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V. Conclusions, Recommendations, and Areas 
for Further Research 
A. Conclusions 
Over the last 10 years, the DoD has steadily shown increases in the number 
of dollars spent on the acquisition of services, accounting for over half of total 
contract spending.  This increased reliance on service contractors has prompted the 
GAO and DoDIG to increase surveillance and issue numerous reports citing 
deficiencies and weaknesses in the acquisition and contract management process.  
These flaws were noted in every aspect of the contracting process, such as 
insufficient market research, choosing an inappropriate contract type, poor 
contractor oversight, and lack of properly trained government personnel. 
Another major issue is that while these spending increases have occurred, 
the acquisition workforce has steadily decreased.  The knowledge gap created from 
this decrease has contributed significantly to ineffective contract management over 
the last decade.  Well-trained and capable personnel are essential for successful 
management of service contracts.  It is imperative that the correct metrics are 
utilized to define and measure that success. 
This research project was conducted to further analyze services contracting 
management practices within the Navy.  The goal was to answer three research 
questions in order to strengthen the Navy’s understanding of successful services 
acquisitions from disparate stakeholder perspectives: 
 How do different stakeholders define successful services contracts 
within the Navy? 
 How do different stakeholders measure services contracts within the 
Navy? 
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The objective of this research was to build upon the understanding developed 
in prior research projects to generate metrics for defining and measuring successful 
services contracts.  These developed metrics could help identify factors that 
influence successful services contract outcomes. 
We found that when defining success all stakeholders tend to utilize outcome-
related factors over process-oriented factors.  This is because outcomes tend to 
drive perceptions of success more than processes.  Outcomes such as customer 
satisfaction or meeting major milestones are easily identified, whereas processes 
tend to be more ambiguous.  A process, such as conducting market research in 
accordance with the FAR, does not necessarily define success.  Based on our 
findings, processes are important factors in that they contribute to the overall 
success, but not necessarily the definition success.  For example, public policy 
dictates that the government shall provide for full and open competition, award to 
small business when appropriate, and negotiate fair and reasonable prices.  These 
are all statutory requirements.  Based on our research findings, these processes do 
not necessarily define the success of a service contract; however, they will 
determine if a contract was awarded in accordance with federal law and public 
policy.  Thus, it is conceivable that a contract may be defined as successful in terms 
of outcomes (cost, schedule, performance) but, based on processes, may be in 
violation of public policy. 
The findings with relation to measuring the success of a service contract were 
comparable to defining success.  More participants favored outcomes, but this can 
also be explained by looking at the factors within the broad category.  Cost and 
schedule are easy factors to track and the results can generally be quantified.  If a 
schedule is not met, then the contract could be considered unsuccessful. However, 
when there is no appropriate contractor oversight, a process, success is not 
necessarily sacrificed. 
We found that stakeholders are inclined to define and measure success in 
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likely occurrence of events throughout the service contracting cycle.  When asked to 
rate the factors on a Likert scale, all stakeholders agree that process-related factors 
such as communication, administrative burden, and clear objectives are of high 
importance.  They also agree that outcomes relating specifically to cost, schedule, 
and performance are important when defining the success of a contract.  However, 
when asked to rank these factors, stakeholders favor outcomes rather than 
processes when defining success. 
We discovered that when measuring the success of a service contract all 
stakeholders feel that outcomes are better measures of success than processes, as 
indicated by their responses both on the Likert scale and when ranking separate 
factors.  This was revealed because outcomes are easily quantifiable.  It is fairly 
easy to track costs, rate performance, and differentiate between a contract that is on 
schedule and one that is falling behind schedule.  It is not as easy to determine an 
appropriate level of administrative work, a proper amount of communication between 
stakeholders, or the correct number of change orders or modifications that are 
necessary. 
We also found that CORs view processes as more important than 
COs/specialists when measuring the success of a service contract.  CORs, ideally, 
are in frequent communication with the COs/specialists to convey the progress and 
performance on a contract so the CORs view processes as significantly more 
important.  Another reason that CORs rate processes more favorably than 
COs/specialists is that protests will completely stop work on a contract, and the 
CORs believe that a protest will result in an unsuccessful contract. 
Our research shows that the metrics used to measure success are typically 
related to cost, schedule, and performance.  There is, however, no general 
consensus among stakeholders as to what can be interpreted as the most important 
of these metrics.  According to the data we collected, some demographics 
considered performance the most important measure, whereas others found cost to 
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B. Recommendations 
Process-related factors need to be emphasized in stakeholders’ definitions of 
success.  Outcome-related factors of cost, schedule, and performance are dominant, 
while processes are viewed with little importance when defining success. It is 
evident that this is an issue.  Choosing the appropriate contract type, a step in the 
planning process, should be of great importance when defining the success of a 
service contract.  Time-and-materials or cost-type contracts could result in 
overpayment, and cost is considered an important factor when defining success.  A 
well-written and clear statement of work should also be highlighted when defining 
success.  If the contractor or the acquisition team does not understand the 
requirement, modifications are necessary, and increased costs or a schedule slip 
could result.  Process-related factors are inextricably tied to the definition of success 
of a service contract, and steps need to be taken so that stakeholders understand 
and act on their importance. 
Internal control measures should be in place to ensure that proper processes 
are being followed and that all stakeholders place high importance on the value of 
these processes.  If stakeholders are forced to take into consideration processes 
when measuring and defining the success of a service contract, some of the 
deficiencies in services procurement could be corrected.  An example of an internal 
control measure is the Services Requirements Review Board, a program that 
NAVSEA implemented in 2011.  Commonly referred to as “Services Court,” the 
program is an annual review of the full range of NAVSEA service requirements to 
understand what services are required and ensure proper oversight is in place so 
that there is maximum value for dollars spent (NAVSEA, 2012).  The board is 
chaired by the NAVSEA Commander, Vice Admiral Kevin McCoy, and Executive 
Director Brian Persons in order to involve leadership at the very top level.  As a 
result of their findings, NAVSEA has modified their policies to ensure a clearer 
definition of service requirements, require more stringent contract file maintenance, 
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(NAVSEA, 2012).  All of these reforms are process related and other commands 
could benefit by implementing similar internal control measures. 
Another way to increase the emphasis placed on processes when defining 
and measuring success is to put in place an operational audit process.  This tool can 
be used to determine the extent of use of process-related factors when defining and 
measuring success with relation to service contracts.  If the correct processes are 
being followed in a proper way, then it is only natural that desired, or successful, 
outcomes will follow.  A formal audit board should be staffed with their sole 
responsibility consisting of conducting audits and assessing the extent of proper use 
of processes in the service contracting process. 
The DoD should implement the use of program management concepts to the 
services acquisition process.  This would place a more rigid structure on how 
services are procured and the contracts subsequently administered.  It would also 
ensure the involvement of PMs.  Of the three major stakeholders, PMs made up the 
smallest portion or respondents.  Previous research also notes the apparent lack of 
PMs involved in the process (Miller et al., 2012).  The program management 
approach also forces the PM to be accountable to the MDA, who is briefed 
periodically throughout the life cycle.  Program management concepts dictate the 
utilization of IPTs so that there is no lack of knowledge at any point in the acquisition 
process.  The DoD would benefit from the application of program management 
concepts to service acquisition. 
A final recommendation is that a standardized reporting process should be in 
place in order to track contractor performance related to both processes and 
outcomes.  The COR should be intimately involved in this reporting process and 
status needs to be regularly conveyed to the stakeholders.  This report should 
include cost elements, as well as schedule and performance elements.  However, it 
need not be limited to only those factors.  If CORs are forced to report on adherence 
to a communication plan as well as customer satisfaction, the stakeholders could 
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satisfaction surveys deal with outcomes, but they could also refer to 
communications, planning, and administration.  If a standardized reporting process 
were in place, it might be possible to accurately capture metrics in order to define 
and measure the success of a service contract. 
C. Areas for Further Research 
The research participants included in this study were strictly from United 
States Navy commands.  Due to this single Service perspective, we recommend 
expanding this research to include participants from the United States Marine Corps, 
Army, and Air Force.  We were unable to incorporate data from customers and 
contractors for DoD services acquisitions.  As such, we recommend further research 
include a more complete mix of stakeholders by including contractors and 
customers. 
NAVSEA employs a “Services Court” process to strengthen oversight and 
improve service acquisition outcomes. These newly implemented internal control 
processes provide an excellent opportunity for future research directed towards 
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Appendix A: Tables of Survey Results 
Table A1.  Aggregate Stakeholders’ Means With Distributions  
Aggregate 
Stakeholders  
Define  Measure 
Likert 
Mean  
1 2 3 4 5 
Likert 
Mean 1 2 3 4 5 
Process  3.97 31 103 147 348 419 2.47 85 83 57 44 26 
Outcome  4.08 9 58 161 537 437 3.80 46 119 219 363 198
 Cost  4.03 3 19 49 158 106 4.04 0 3 27 90 39 
 Schedule  3.93 2 29 56 164 96 4.00 1 5 23 96 36 
 Performance  4.29 4 10 56 215 235 3.36 45 111 169 177 123
 
Table A2.  Aggregate Stakeholders’ Highest Ranking % 
Aggregate 
Stakeholders  
Define  Measure 
Highest Rank % Highest Rank % 
Process  40% 46% 
Outcome  60% 54% 
 Cost  15% 19% 
 Schedule  19% 12% 
 Performance  26% 24% 
 
Table A3.  Stakeholder Means With Distributions 
Stakeholders  Define Measure 
Likert 
Mean 
1 2 3 4 5 
Likert 
Mean 
1 2 3 4 5 
PM 
Process  3.87 1 11 11 30 30 2.52 4 8 8 4 1 
Outcome  4.13 0 4 10 40 39 3.78 8 8 21 25 18 
 Cost  4.24 0 0 3 15 9 4.15 0 0 1 10 3 
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 Performance  4.51 0 0 1 16 23 3.25 8 7 18 7 12 
COR 
Process  3.97 8 12 19 55 62 2.76 6 15 7 11 3 
Outcome  4.15 0 9 15 52 68 3.77 10 22 39 49 23 
 Cost  4.16 0 3 5 23 19 4.23 0 0 3 11 8 
 Schedule  4.06 0 4 8 21 19 4.08 0 1 2 16 6 
 Performance  4.23 0 2 2 8 30 2.99 10 21 34 22 9 
CO 
Process  3.97 22 75 112 239 307 2.41 71 56 40 28 21 
Outcome  4.06 7 43 122 390 305 3.81 28 82 149 271 153 
 Cost  3.98 3 16 40 106 76 3.98 0 3 23 63 27 
 Schedule  3.91 2 20 39 127 63 3.98 1 3 19 67 26 
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Table A4.  Stakeholder Highest Ranking % 
Stakeholders  Define  Measure 
Highest Rank % Highest Rank % 
PM 
Process  41% 43% 
Outcome  59% 57% 
 Cost  11% 13% 
 Schedule  22% 14% 
 Performance  27% 30% 
COR 
Process  39% 39% 
Outcome  61% 61% 
 Cost  17% 28% 
 Schedule  19% 9% 
 Performance  24% 24% 
CO  
Process  40% 49% 
Outcome  60% 51% 
 Cost  15% 17% 
 Schedule  17% 12% 
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Table A5.  DAWIA Level Means With Distributions 
DAWIA 
LEVELS 
Define  Measure 
Likert 
Mean 
1 2 3 4 5 
Likert 
Mean 
1 2 3 4 5 
LEVEL I  
Process  4.00 9 29 47 125 131 2.20 23 23 23 15 8 
Outcome  4.14 1 10 56 166 161 3.76 16 40 77 108 65 
 Cost  4.12 0 2 16 51 41 3.88 0 0 9 24 18 
 Schedule  3.96 0 6 20 53 34 3.96 0 2 6 33 12 
 Performance  4.35 1 2 20 62 86 3.44 16 38 62 51 35 
LEVEL II 
Process  4.16 7 19 47 103 160 2.63 24 22 19 16 11 
Outcome  4.17 2 9 49 174 150 3.86 13 30 64 120 67 
 Cost  4.14 2 3 14 47 42 4.08 0 0 6 34 10 
 Schedule  4.03 0 6 17 55 33 4.02 0 0 9 30 10 
 Performance  4.35 0 0 18 72 75 3.49 13 30 49 56 47 
LEVEL III 
Process  3.79 15 55 53 120 128 2.22 38 38 15 13 7 
Outcome  4.01 6 39 56 197 126 3.72 17 49 78 135 66 
 Cost  3.76 1 14 19 60 23 3.88 0 3 12 32 11 
 Schedule  4.01 2 17 19 56 29 3.95 1 3 8 33 14 
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Table A6.  DAWIA Level Highest Rank % 
Stakeholders  Define  Measure 
Highest Rank % Highest Rank % 
Level I 
Process  42% 49% 
Outcome  58% 61% 
 Cost  19% 16% 
 Schedule  14% 12% 
 Performance  25% 23% 
Level II 
Process  39% 48% 
Outcome  61% 52% 
 Cost  12% 14% 
 Schedule  19% 14% 
 Performance  30% 23% 
Level III 
Process  40% 43% 
Outcome  60% 57% 
 Cost  15% 21% 
 Schedule  19% 12% 
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Table A7.  Service Type Means With Distributions 
Service 
Type    
Define  Measure 
Likert 
Mean 
1 2 3 4 5 
Likert 
Mean 
1 2 3 4 5 
Equipment Related 
Process  4.05 7 25 69 147 159 2.68 27 25 23 17 14 
Outcome  4.10 2 13 70 221 160 3.76 17 44 94 143 72 
 Cost  4.03 1 5 21 64 39 4.08 0 0 12 39 17 
 Schedule  3.97 0 6 25 70 33 3.87 0 2 14 39 10 
 
Performance  
4.28 1 2 24 87 88 3.34 17 42 68 65 45 
Knowledge Based   
Process  3.92 15 59 52 138 179 2.29 43 37 20 19 7 
Outcome  4.02 6 38 60 223 180 3.82 20 46 88 155 88 
 Cost  4.00 1 11 19 65 45 3.97 0 2 12 39 14 
 Schedule  3.82 2 21 20 63 41 4.07 1 2 8 37 20 
 
Performance  
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Table A8.  Service Type Highest Rank % 
Service Type    Define  Measure 
Highest Rank % Highest Rank % 
Equipment Related 
Process  42% 44% 
Outcome  58% 56% 
 Cost  15% 21% 
 Schedule  18% 13% 
 Performance  25% 22% 
Knowledge Based   
Process  39% 48% 
Outcome  61% 52% 
 Cost  16% 16% 
 Schedule  18% 11% 
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Appendix B:  Statistical Analysis Results 
Table B1.  Statistical Analysis of Process Definition Between CORs and COs 
PROCESS DEFINE 
F-Test Two-Sample for Variances 
  COR CO 
Mean 3.96795 3.971164 
Variance 0.26893 0.3253929 
Observations 26 126 
df 25 125 
F 0.82648
P(F <= f) one-tail 0.29793
F Critical one-tail 0.56619   
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances 
  COR CO 
Mean 3.96795 3.971164 
Variance 0.26893 0.3253929 






P(T <= t) one-tail 0.48943
t Critical one-tail 1.65508
P(T <= t) two-tail 0.97885
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These tables display the statistical analysis conducted to determine if the 
mean of Likert scale responses with regards to the importance of processes when 
defining success from the COR and CO showed any significant difference.  The F-
test shows that the variance between responses is assumed to be 0.  The t-test 
shows that there is no significant difference. 
Table B2.  Statistical Analysis of Outcome Definition Between CORs and COs 
OUTCOME DEFINE 
F-Test Two-Sample for Variances 
  COR CO 
Mean 4.14744 4.05776 
Variance 0.25258 0.27918 
Observations 26 126 
df 25 125 
F 0.90471
P(F <= f) one-tail 0.40164
F Critical one-tail 0.56619   
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances 
  COR CO 
Mean 4.14744 4.05776 
Variance 0.25258 0.27918 






P(T <= t) one-tail 0.21415
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P(T <= t) two-tail 0.4283
t Critical two-tail 1.97591   
These tables display the statistical analysis conducted to determine if the 
mean of Likert scale responses with regards to the importance of outcomes when 
defining success from the COR and CO showed any significant difference.  The F-
test shows that the variance between responses is assumed to be 0.  The t-test 
shows that there is no significant difference. 
Table B3.  Statistical Analysis of Process Measurement Between CORs and 
COs 
PROCESS MEASURE 
F-Test Two-Sample for Variances 
  COR CO 
Mean 2.79167 2.40789 
Variance 1.10688 0.99365 
Observations 24 114 
df 23 113 
F 1.11395
P(F <= f) one-tail 0.34183
F Critical one-tail 1.62527   
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances 
  COR CO 
Mean 2.79167 2.40789 
Variance 1.10688 0.99365 
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t Stat 1.69797
P(T <= t) one-tail 0.0459
t Critical one-tail 1.65613
P(T <= t) two-tail 0.0918
t Critical two-tail 1.97756   
These tables display the statistical analysis conducted to determine if the 
mean of Likert scale responses with regards to the importance of processes when 
measuring success from the COR and CO showed any significant difference.  The 
F-test shows that the variance between responses is assumed to be 0.  The t-test 
shows that there is a statistically significant difference. 
Table B4.  Statistical Analysis of Outcome Measurement Between CORs and 
COs 
OUTCOME MEASURE 
F-Test Two-Sample for Variances 
  COR CO 
Mean 3.49028 3.47899 
Variance 0.28015 0.33389 
Observations 25 118 
df 24 117 
F 0.83905
P(F <= f) one-tail 0.31894
F Critical one-tail 0.55834   
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances 
  COR CO 
Mean 3.49028 3.47899 
Variance 0.28015 0.33389 












P(T <= t) one-tail 0.46422
t Critical one-tail 1.65573
P(T <= t) two-tail 0.92844
t Critical two-tail 1.97693   
These tables display the statistical analysis conducted to determine if the 
mean of Likert scale responses with regards to the importance of outcomes when 
measuring success from the COR and CO showed any significant difference.  The 
F-test shows that the variance between responses is assumed to be 0.  The t-test 
shows that there is no significant difference. 
Table B5.  Statistical Analysis of Process Definition Between CORs and PMs 
PROCESS DEFINE 
F-Test Two-Sample for Variances 
  COR PM 
Mean 3.96795 3.86667 
Variance 0.26893 0.20704 
Observations 26 13 
df 25 12 
F 1.29895
P(F <= f) one-tail 0.32559
F Critical one-tail 2.49773   
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances 
  COR PM 
Mean 3.96795 3.86667 
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P(T <= t) one-tail 0.27684
t Critical one-tail 1.68709
P(T <= t) two-tail 0.55368
t Critical two-tail 2.02619   
These tables display the statistical analysis conducted to determine if the 
mean of Likert scale responses with regards to the importance of processes when 
defining success from the COR and PM showed any significant difference.  The F-
test shows that the variance between responses is assumed to be 0.  The t-test 
shows that there is no significant difference. 
Table B6.  Statistical Analysis of Outcome Definition Between CORs and PMs 
OUTCOME DEFINE 
F-Test Two-Sample for Variances 
  COR PM 
Mean 4.14744 4.11538 
Variance 0.25258 0.17359 
Observations 26 13 
df 25 12 
F 1.45502
P(F <= f) one-tail 0.25204
F Critical one-tail 2.49773   
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances 
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Mean 4.14744 4.11538 
Variance 0.25258 0.17359 






P(T <= t) one-tail 0.42204
t Critical one-tail 1.68709
P(T <= t) two-tail 0.84408
t Critical two-tail 2.02619   
These tables display the statistical analysis conducted to determine if the 
mean of Likert scale responses with regards to the importance of outcomes when 
defining success from the COR and PM showed any significant difference.  The F-
test shows that the variance between responses is assumed to be 0.  The t-test 
shows that there is no significant difference. 
Table B7.  Statistical Analysis of Process Measurement Between CORs and 
PMs 
PROCESS MEASURE 
F-Test Two-Sample for Variances 
  COR PM 
Mean 2.88248 2.46154 
Variance 1.13514 0.8109 
Observations 26 13 
df 25 12 
F 1.39986
P(F <= f) one-tail 0.27594
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t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances 
  COR PM 
Mean 2.88248 2.46154 
Variance 1.13514 0.8109 






P(T <= t) one-tail 0.1149
t Critical one-tail 1.68709
P(T <= t) two-tail 0.22979
t Critical two-tail 2.02619   
These tables display the statistical analysis conducted to determine if the 
mean of Likert scale responses with regards to the importance of processes when 
measuring success from the COR and PM showed any significant difference.  The 
F-test shows that the variance between responses is assumed to be 0.  The t-test 
shows that there is no significant difference. 
Table B8.  Statistical Analysis of Outcome Measurement Between CORs and 
PMs 
OUTCOME MEASURE 
F-Test Two-Sample for Variances 
  COR PM 
Mean 3.49028 3.44231 
Variance 0.28015 0.26853 
Observations 25 13 
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F 1.04328
P(F <= f) one-tail 0.48911
F Critical one-tail 2.50548   
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances 
  COR PM 
Mean 3.49028 3.44231 
Variance 0.28015 0.26853 






P(T <= t) one-tail 0.39553
t Critical one-tail 1.6883
P(T <= t) two-tail 0.79107
t Critical two-tail 2.02809   
These tables display the statistical analysis conducted to determine if the 
mean of Likert scale responses with regards to the importance of outcomes when 
measuring success from the COR and PM showed any significant difference.  The 
F-test shows that the variance between responses is assumed to be 0.  The t-test 
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Table B9.  Statistical Analysis of Process Definition Between COs and PMs 
PROCESS DEFINE 
F-Test Two-Sample for Variances 
  CO PM 
Mean 3.97116 3.86667 
Variance 0.32539 0.20704 
Observations 126 13 
df 125 12 
F 1.57167
P(F <= f) one-tail 0.19214
F Critical one-tail 2.33924   
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances 
  CO PM 
Mean 3.97116 3.86667 
Variance 0.32539 0.20704 






P(T <= t) one-tail 0.26191
t Critical one-tail 1.65605
P(T <= t) two-tail 0.52381
t Critical two-tail 1.97743   
These tables display the statistical analysis conducted to determine if the 
mean of Likert scale responses with regards to the importance of processes when 
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shows that the variance between responses is assumed to be 0.  The t-test shows 
that there is no significant difference. 
Table B10.  Statistical Analysis of Outcome Definition Between COs and PMs 
OUTCOME DEFINE 
F-Test Two-Sample for Variances 
  CO PM 
Mean 4.05776 4.11538 
Variance 0.27918 0.17359 
Observations 126 13 
df 125 12 
F 1.60826
P(F <= f) one-tail 0.17953
F Critical one-tail 2.33924   
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances 
  CO PM 
Mean 4.05776 4.11538 
Variance 0.27918 0.17359 






P(T <= t) one-tail 0.35199
t Critical one-tail 1.65605
P(T <= t) two-tail 0.70399
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These tables display the statistical analysis conducted to determine if the 
mean of Likert scale responses with regards to the importance of outcomes when 
defining success from the CO and PM showed any significant difference.  The F-test 
shows that the variance between responses is assumed to be 0.  The t-test shows 
that there is no significant difference. 
Table B11.  Statistical Analysis of Process Measurement Between COs and 
PMs 
PROCESS MEASURE 
F-Test Two-Sample for Variances 
  CO PM 
Mean 2.40789 2.46154 
Variance 0.99365 0.8109 
Observations 114 13 
df 113 12 
F 1.22538
P(F <= f) one-tail 0.36651
F Critical one-tail 2.34371   
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances 
  CO PM 
Mean 2.40789 2.46154 
Variance 0.99365 0.8109 






P(T <= t) one-tail 0.42658
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P(T <= t) two-tail 0.85315
t Critical two-tail 1.97912   
These tables display the statistical analysis conducted to determine if the 
mean of Likert scale responses with regards to the importance of processes when 
measuring success from the CO and PM showed any significant difference.  The F-
test shows that the variance between responses is assumed to be 0.  The t-test 
shows that there is no significant difference. 
Table B12.  Statistical Analysis of Outcome Measurement Between COs and 
PMs 
OUTCOME MEASURE 
F-Test Two-Sample for Variances 
  CO PM 
Mean 3.47899 3.44231 
Variance 0.33389 0.26853 
Observations 118 13 
df 117 12 
F 1.24341
P(F <= f) one-tail 0.35453
F Critical one-tail 2.34212   
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances 
  CO PM 
Mean 3.47899 3.44231 
Variance 0.33389 0.26853 
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t Stat 0.21924
P(T <= t) one-tail 0.4134
t Critical one-tail 1.65675
P(T <= t) two-tail 0.82681
t Critical two-tail 1.97852   
These tables display the statistical analysis conducted to determine if the 
mean of Likert scale responses with regards to the importance of outcomes when 
measuring success from the CO and PM showed any significant difference.  The F-
test shows that the variance between responses is assumed to be 0.  The t-test 
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